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Abstract
The objectives of this study were to assess whether current surveillance capacity is sufficient to fulfill EU and Danish
regulations to control a hypothetical foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in Denmark, and whether enlarging the
protection and/or surveillance zones could minimize economic losses. The stochastic spatial simulation model DTU-DADS
was further developed to simulate clinical surveillance of herds within the protection and surveillance zones and used to
model spread of FMD between herds. A queuing system was included in the model, and based on daily surveillance
capacity, which was 450 herds per day, it was decided whether herds appointed for surveillance would be surveyed on the
current day or added to the queue. The model was run with a basic scenario representing the EU and Danish regulations,
which includes a 3 km protection and 10 km surveillance zone around detected herds. In alternative scenarios, the
protection zone was enlarged to 5 km, the surveillance zone was enlarged to 15 or 20 km, or a combined enlargement of
the protection and surveillance zones was modelled. Sensitivity analysis included changing surveillance capacity to 200, 350
or 600 herds per day, frequency of repeated visits for herds in overlapping surveillance zones from every 14 days to every 7,
21 and 30 days, and the size of the zones combined with a surveillance capacity increased to 600 herds per day. The results
showed that the default surveillance capacity is sufficient to survey herds on time. Extra resources for surveillance did not
improve the situation, but fewer resources could result in larger epidemics and costs. Enlarging the protection zone was a
better strategy than the basic scenario. Despite that enlarging the surveillance zone might result in shorter epidemic
duration, and lower number of affected herds, it resulted frequently in larger economic losses.
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Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral
disease affecting ruminants and pigs [1,2,3], and may have a large
economic impact on FMD-free countries and regions, in case of an
epidemic [4,5].
Following the FMD epidemic within the European Union (EU)
in 2001, the European Commission updated a set of regulations
and measures to control possible future epidemics of FMD in its
member states [6,7]. The measures include, among others,
depopulation of detected herds and establishing 3 km protection
and 10 km surveillance zones around them, in which movement
restrictions and surveillance of herds are performed. As these
measures, however, may not be sufficient to control an expanding
or already widespread epidemic, additional control measures must
be considered, such as emergency vaccination [7] and/or pre-
emptive depopulation [8].
For the national veterinary authorities, the application of
protective emergency vaccination insures a public support
compared to the mass killing of healthy animals, in case
suppressive emergency vaccination or pre-emptive depopulation
is applied [6,9]. Nonetheless, from economic standpoint, protec-
tive emergency vaccination seems not to be a recommended
control strategy in case of an epidemic in Denmark [10]. Thus the
question remains to whether it is possible to minimize the
economic loss due to an FMD epidemic in a large exporting
country of livestock and livestock products such as Denmark,
without the need to kill a large number of animals.
Clinical surveillance of herds within the protection and
surveillance zones has the purpose to detect infected herds early,
and thus limit the spread of the disease. The effect of enlargement
of the zones must depend on whether the spread of disease is
limited within the existing zones, or whether the disease is often
spread to the area surrounding the zones. It has been shown that
the disease can spread from one herd to another over distances
longer than 10 km, which is the radius of the standard surveillance
zone [11,12,13]. This means that enlargement of zones might limit
the spread of the disease.
In order to model enlargements of zones and clinical
surveillance properly, it is necessary to take into account the
available resources for clinical surveillance. Resources can be a
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limitation, which is necessary to consider in a country that is
densely populated with livestock herds, such as Denmark, where
the daily number of herds to be surveyed might be larger than the
surveillance capacity.
It is therefore important to model clinical surveillance properly,
which will allow an assessment of whether the current surveillance
capacity is sufficient to survey herds on time as required by the EU
[7], and the Danish regulations [14], and to prevent delays that
could result in extra economic losses The Danish regulations
require all herds, within the surveillance zones, to be surveyed
within the first 7 days following the establishment of the zone [14].
Modelling these processes will allow an assessment of whether
enlargements of the protection and/or surveillance zones, could
limit disease spread and the economic losses.
Simulation models are valuable tools that are used to assist the
veterinary authorities in contingency planning
[4,8,10,11,15,16,17,18]. They have also been used to study the
potential spread of FMD and to evaluate the effectiveness of
potential control strategies during an FMD outbreak [19]. To our
knowledge, FMD models have not been used to assist whether
surveillance capacity in a country is sufficient to survey herds
without delays or whether extra resources are needed. Further-
more, the epidemiological and economic effects of enlarging the
protection and/or surveillance zones and the impact of surveil-
lance frequency of herds, in overlapping zones, on epidemic
consequences have, to our knowledge, not been investigated
before.
The objectives of this research were to assess: 1) whether the
current surveillance capacity is sufficient to fulfill the EU and
Danish regulations to control a hypothetical FMD epidemic in
Denmark, 2) whether enlarging the surveillance and/or the
protection zones could minimize the economic losses, using either
default surveillance capacity, or extra resources for surveillance,
and 3) to determine the impact of surveillance frequency of herds
in overlapping surveillance zones on epidemic consequences.
Materials and Methods
Study area and population
The study consisted of all Danish cattle, swine, sheep and goat
herds in the period from 1st October 2006 until 30th September
2007. This period was chosen to avoid possible influence from the
outbreak of bluetongue in Denmark in October 2007. The data
included 23,550 cattle herds, 11,473 swine herds and 15,830 sheep
and goat herds. For each herd, the herd data included the Danish
Herd ID System, referred to as CHR (central husbandry register)
number, herd type, UTM geo-coordinates, number of animals,
and rate of animal movements from the herd per day. Herds were
categorized into 3 categories: cattle, swine, and sheep and goats.
Cattle herds were categorized as dairy or non-dairy herds. Swine
herds were categorized into 19 different types based on their
production type and Specific Pathogen Free (SPF) status [20].
Sheep and goats were grouped and treated equally (referred to as
sheep herds throughout the paper), because Denmark has a very
limited number of goat herds, and because of the disease dynamics
in goat herds are expected to be similar to sheep herds. When a
farm included several animal species, each species was given a
different ID and set as a different herd on the same location and
with the same CHR number. Information about markets was also
available, including the UTM geo-coordinates.
The input parameters of the model were based on Danish data,
the literature and personal communication from experts, and are
available in the supplementary materials of a recent publication
[10].
The simulation model
The model simulated hypothetical spread of FMD between
herds in Denmark using the dynamic spatial simulation model
DTU-DADS (version 0.140), that runs in the statistical software R
(Version 3.0.2) [21], based on daily discrete time events. This is an
updated version of the DTU-DADS model (version 0.100)
[6,10,11], which incorporates changes necessary to model
resources for surveillance.
The first change included modelling resources for surveillance
of herds within the protection and surveillance zones and for
traced herds. A queuing system was added to the model, and herds
in the protection zone would be set to queue for surveillance two
times, once directly following inclusion in the protection zone, and
a second time 21 days later, while herds in the surveillance zones
would be set to queue for surveillance one time only, directly after
inclusion in the zone. For each day modelled, the daily resources
for surveillance would determine the number of herds in the queue
that would be surveyed. The rest of the queued herds would wait
until resources are available. It was assumed that herds that are
within multiple surveillance zones will be visited every 14 days, as
long as they are in multiple surveillance zones. When a herd enters
a new surveillance zone, while it was not anymore in any zone, 8
days must elapse before the herd would get a new surveillance
visit. When a herd was in the queue for.7 days but#14 days, the
second visit, for herds within the protection zone, was changed
from 21 to 14 days after the first visit, while when a herd was in the
queue for .14 days, the second visit, for herds in the protection
zone, was changed to 7 days later. This was carried out to insure
that herds are surveyed before lifting the zones [7], to keep the
restrictions on movements from and to the herd, and to bind
zones’ duration to 30 days, in order to limit potential economic
damage due to longer zones duration. Nonetheless, to insure that
all herds are visited before lifting a zone, when any herd was in the
queue for .21 days, the duration of all zones was extended by the
longest time a herd was in the queue. For instance, as soon as a
herd was in a queue for 22 days, the zone duration was extended
from 30 to 52 days. In case a herd was set in the queue for a
second visit, while it was already queuing from a previous visit,
only the first visit would be executed.
A group of veterinarians and experts from the Danish
Veterinary Authorities came together in 2013, in order to assess
the available resources in case of an outbreak in Denmark
(Personal communication, Maren Holm Johansen from the
Danish Veterinary Authorities). Based on the available resources,
it was estimated that it would be possible to survey, approximately,
450 herds per day. This number was used as the default
surveillance resources capacity and was changed as explained
bellow in the sensitivity analysis.
Detection of infected herds is carried out using 3 processes,
which are detection of first infected herd, detection of herds by the
farmer (basic detection) and finally detection through surveillance
visits (as explained above). In the previous version of the model,
detection of the first outbreak was always fixed to day 21 following
the infection start [6,10,11]. Despite that this was based on actual
detection data from the UK and the Dutch epidemics in 2001,
variation is expected, and hence the detection of the first outbreak
was set using a PERT (Program Evaluation and Review
Technique) distribution with 18, 21, and 23 days as a minimum,
most likely and maximum values, respectively, based on the
sensitivity analysis from a previous study [6].
In the previous version of the DTU-DADS model, all infected
herds would be eventually detected using the basic detection. This
is not realistic as signs could pass undetected in small herds. Basic
detection was therefore modelled based on our previous work
Resources for Clinical Surveillance of Foot-and-Mouth Disease
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using InterSpread Plus (version 2.001.11) [10]. Infected herds
would be subjected to a probability of selection of 80%. The
selected herds would then be subjected to a Bernoulli process of
detection based on probabilities of detection that are based on the
number of days following the appearance of clinical signs. These
probabilities reflected the basic surveillance (farmers’ awareness).
Detection following surveillance in the zones was also dependent
on the number of days following the appearance of clinical signs
within the herd, for cattle and swine herds. Sheep herds were
sampled for serological analysis as well, and hence probability of
detection, in sheep herds, depended on number of days following
infection [10]. Herds that were not detected would be recovered
from the disease. Recovery was based on a mechanistic module of
within-herd spread built in the DTU-DADS model [11,15]. When
all animals in an un-detected herd were recovered, the herd was
considered a recovered herd (infection was not detected).
Disease spread
The simulation starts with one index herd, which is the first
infected herd in the epidemic. Other studies have shown that the
index herd does influence the size and duration of the epidemic
[11,16,20]. To include the variation caused by different index
herds, we randomly selected index herds of different herd type and
when relevant from areas with different animal densities. The
index herds were 1,000 cattle herds located in areas with high
cattle density, 1,000 in areas with low cattle density, 1,000 swine
herds located in areas with high swine density and 1,000 in areas
with low swine density, and 1,000 sheep herds. In total 5,000
iterations were run per scenario.
Spread of infection between herds was simulated through 7
spread mechanisms: 1) direct animal movement between herds; 2)
abattoir trucks; 3) milk tankers; 4) veterinarians, artificial
inseminators, and/or a milk controllers (medium risk contact); 5)
visitors, feedstuff and/or rendering trucks (low risk contact); 6)
markets; and 7) local spread.
Based on actual movement data, a rate of movements per day
was calculated for each herd. The individual daily movement rate
was used as lambda in a Poisson distribution to represent the
number of movements per day. Similarly, a rate of abattoir
deliveries per day was calculated based on herds’ actual data and
used in a Poisson distribution to simulate the number of
movements to the abattoir per day from the infectious herd.
Thereafter, the number of herds visited by an abattoir truck on the
way to the abattoir following visit to an infected herd was
estimated from a Poisson distribution with a lambda depending on
the herd type. Based on milk tank deliveries a lambda was
calculated and used in a Poisson distribution, to represent the
number of times milk is picked up in dairy herds [10]. Likewise,
medium and low risk contacts were simulated, but with different
lambdas and risks of infection as presented previously [10].
Because markets in Denmark are restricted to cattle only, an
infection spreading from a market can initially affect only cattle
herds. The spread via markets would be due to direct movements
of infected animal to susceptible herds, or via people and vehicles
that had been in contact with the infected animals, and then
contacted susceptible herds.
Local spread was defined as infection of susceptible herds within
a 3 km radius around the infected herd [10,17] due to
unexplained reasons dependent or independent of human
activities, such as rodents, birds and flies, machineries and
equipment moved between neighboring herds, and to a limited
degree airborne spread. Herds located on the same farm had a
daily chance of infection of 95%, when one herd was infected.
When a herd was infected, the disease would spread until the
herd was detected, and hence was depopulated. The period from
when a herd starts showing clinical signs until it was detected, with
basic detection, was dependent on the herd type, e.g. cattle herds
were detected faster than sheep herds, because some sheep do not
show clinical signs.
Basic control strategy
After detection of the first infected herd, a set of control
measures were applied, representing the basic scenario. These
included: 1) depopulation, cleaning and disinfection of detected
herds; 2) a 3 days national stand still on direct animal movements
in the country; 3) creation of a 3 km protection zone and a 10 km
surveillance zone around the detected herds; in which movements
between herds and out of the zone were restricted and herds were
surveyed one (surveillance zone) or two (protection zone) times
before lifting the zone; 4) backward and forward tracing of
contacts from and to detected herds. When a herd had received
animals from a detected herd, the receiving herd was also
depopulated and disinfected, while in case of other kinds of
contacts, the herd was surveyed. When a herd was subject to
surveillance, the animals were inspected for clinical signs of FMD.
Sheep herds were also sampled for serological analysis [10].
The daily animal depopulation capacity was set at 2,400
ruminants and 4,800 pigs [10]. Detected herds had higher priority
for depopulation than traced herds. In case of several herds on the
same farm, all herds on the farm were depopulated, when one
herd was detected.
Alternative scenarios
The alternative scenarios included enlargement of the protec-
tion and/or surveillance zones, with a surveillance capacity of 450
herds a day. The protection zone was enlarged to 5 km, while the
surveillance zone was enlarged to 15 or 20 km in different
scenarios. Furthermore, scenarios were run combining enlarge-
ment of the protection zone to 5 km and the surveillance zone to
15 or 20 km, simultaneously.
Sensitivity analysis
Surveillance capacity was changed from 450 to 200, 350 or 600
herds per day, to study the impact of surveillance capacity on
epidemic course and consequences. Furthermore, to study the
impact of enlarging surveillance and protections zones with higher
resources for surveillance, the zones were enlarged as explained in
the previous section, and the surveillance capacities were increased
from 450 to 600 herds per day.
Herds that are located in multiple surveillance zones would be
surveyed every 14 days as long as they are in multiple surveillance
zones, as explained earlier. A sensitivity analysis was conducted, in
which herds were surveyed every 7, 21 or 30 days instead.
Sensitivity analysis on other important parameters, such as
detection time and risk of infection through the different
mechanisms of disease spread, is presented in an earlier
publication [10].
Costs calculation
The costs and losses of the epidemics were calculated as
presented previously [10]. Briefly, the direct costs consisted of
surveillance, depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, empty
stable, compensation, and national standstill costs. The indirect
Resources for Clinical Surveillance of Foot-and-Mouth Disease
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costs included losses incurred from restrictions on exports to EU
and non-EU countries (export loss). Total costs were calculated per
iteration and their summaries were thereafter calculated.
Statistical analysis
The alternative scenarios were compared to the basic scenario
using epidemiological and economic results. The epidemiological
results were duration of epidemics, the numbers of infected herds,
number of surveillance visits and the numbers of herds detected
from surveillance visits, while economic results included the direct
costs, export loss and the total costs.
To test the statistical differences between the scenarios, we used
the Wilcoxon rank sum test run in the statistical software R
(Version 3.0.2) [21].
Table 1. Median (5th and 95th percentiles) of epidemic duration, number of infected herds, number of surveillance visits, direct
costs, export loss and the total costs of the epidemic, that were initiated in cattle herds in high (highCat) and low (lowCat) cattle
density area, swine herds in high (highPig) and low (lowPig) swine density area and in sheep herds (sheep).
Epidemic duration
(days)1 Infected herds Surveillance visits
Direct Costs
(J6106)
Export loss
(J6106)
Total costs
(J6106)
highCat
Basic 45 (14–113) 56 (10–192) 11,122 (1,896–35,839) 31 (10–103) 491 (388–720) 522 (400–829)
PZ5 44 (13–110) 56 (9–182) 12,345*2 (1,869–35,485) 31 (10–97) 487 (386–718) 519 (398–800)
SZ15 43 (13–95) 51* (9–167) 16,125*** (3,089–37,513) 39*** (12–128) 504 (386–743) 544** (399–860)
SZ20 41*** (13–92) 48*** (9–165) 17,225*** (3,304–38,697) 44*** (13–193) 506*** (395–842) 551*** (408–1,036)
PZ5+SZ15 43 (14–99) 53 (10–175) 16,606*** (3,042–39,932) 39*** (12–139) 502* (388–748) 541*** (402–887)
PZ5+SZ20 41*** (13–94) 47*** (9–151) 17,923*** (4,242–40,728) 45*** (14–193) 507*** (388–849) 553*** (404–1,053)
lowCat
Basic 57 (17–129) 77 (13–269) 12,746 (1,582–37,561) 34 (10–105) 522 (393–766) 558 (405–858)
PZ5 58 (18–131) 77 (13–243) 13,644* (1,928–38,532) 33 (10–101) 524 (394–748) 558 (405–839)
SZ15 50*** (16–119) 70** (12–230) 16,817*** (2,217–42,861) 39*** (11–140) 517 (392–793) 556 (405–924)
SZ20 50*** (15–113) 65*** (12–223) 19,609*** (2,675–45,737) 45*** (12–193) 525 (396–845) 571*** (409–1,032)
PZ5+SZ15 51*** (17–116) 66** (12–238) 17,412*** (2,573–44,438) 38** (11–143) 515 (400–800) 553 (412–933)
PZ5+SZ20 50*** (16–117) 64*** (12–235) 19,307*** (2,879–48,430) 44*** (13–203) 521 (399–893) 564*** (415–1,101)
highPig
Basic 33 (7–101) 27 (4–129) 4,852 (656–26,873) 18 (8–72) 451 (364–657) 468 (372–726)
PZ5 35 (7–98) 28 (4–124) 5,437* (837–26,347) 19 (8–67) 452 (360–659) 469 (369–717)
SZ15 32 (7–90) 26 (4–114) 8,074*** (1,283–30,486) 24** (10–83) 453 (366–661) 477* (379–745)
SZ20 33 (6–84) 25 (4–102) 10,867*** (1,529–33,674) 28*** (11–104) 466*** (366–700) 494*** (378–802)
PZ5+SZ15 33 (7–83) 26 (4–112) 8,513*** (1,281–31,010) 24*** (10–82) 455 (368–644) 476*** (380–722)
PZ5+SZ20 32* (7–85) 26 (4–100) 10,456*** (1,746–34,406) 28*** (11–105) 458** (372–699) 486*** (385–803)
lowPig
Basic 38 (7–113) 32 (4–158) 5,670 (588–25,611) 18 (7–66) 459 (364–679) 477 (372–743)
PZ5 39 (7–108) 31 (4–151) 5,996 (737–27,280) 17 (7–65) 460 (359–673) 479 (367–732)
SZ15 33*** (7–95) 28*** (4–114) 7,811*** (1,034–29,805) 21*** (8–73) 451 (361–656) 472 (371–727)
SZ20 33*** (8–94) 27*** (4–114) 10,452*** (1,631–34,370) 25*** (8–93) 461 (366–693) 486 (376–770)
PZ5+SZ15 33** (8–94) 29*** (4–121) 8,642*** (1,180–30,925) 21*** (8–76) 458 (362–639) 479 (371–718)
PZ5+SZ20 31*** (8–92) 25*** (4–117) 10,268*** (1,757–36,752) 24*** (9–100) 455 (371–704) 479 (380–813)
Sheep
Basic 30 (2–100) 20 (2–138) 3,341 (365–25,220) 13 (6–70) 435 (346–658) 449 (354–722)
PZ5 31 (2–97) 21 (2–126) 3,823* (410–26,260) 14 (6–66) 438 (345–641) 450 (352–710)
SZ15 30 (2–87) 20 (2–121) 5,692*** (571–31,770) 17*** (7–81) 440 (352–657) 458* (360–729)
SZ20 27 (3–83) 18 (2–114) 7,811*** (795–32,775) 20*** (8–112) 441* (350–710) 463** (360–823)
PZ5+SZ15 28 (2–96) 17 (2–124) 5,365*** (632–33,031) 16*** (7–88) 435 (349–683) 452 (357–761)
PZ5+SZ20 27* (3–83) 19 (2–108) 7,544*** (821–31,203) 19*** (8–98) 439 (354–680) 460** (363–782)
Basic control strategy as described by Danish and European legislation was modelled (Basic), and compared to alternative scenarios, with enlargements of the
protection zone from 3 km to 5 km (PZ5) and surveillance zone from 10 km to 15 km (SZ15) or 20 km (SZ20), and a combination of these enlargements.
1Epidemic duration is calculated from detection of the first herd in the epidemic to the last herd is depopulated.
2Statistical significance level in comparison to the corresponding variable in the corresponding basic scenario (absence of a star represents a P-value$0.05, * represents
a P-value ,0.05, ** represents a P-value ,0.01, and *** represents a P-value ,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.t001
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Results
Basic scenario
Out of the 5,000 iterations that represented the 5 different index
herd types, there were 13 iterations in which the epidemics fade
out before the disease was detected. All of these epidemics started
in small sheep herds. In 11 out of the 5,000 iterations, the duration
of the protection and surveillance zones were prolonged to more
than 30 days, due to the lack of resources to survey herds within
the time limit. Nine of these epidemics started in cattle herds. A
large number of the herds that were in surveillance zones were
actually in overlapping surveillance zones. For example, there
were 1,701 (286–4,692, 5th and 95th percentiles (5–95%)) herds
included in 2 or more surveillance zones in epidemics initiated in
cattle herds in high cattle density areas, which is 55% (27–79%) of
the total number of herds in the surveillance zones.
Epidemics initiated in cattle herds were larger, longer in
duration and costlier than epidemics initiated in swine and sheep
herds (Table 1). For example, when epidemics were initiated in
cattle herds in high cattle density areas, the median epidemic
duration was 45 days (14–113 days, 5–95%), the median number
of infected herds was 56 (10–192, 5–95%), and the median total
costs was J522 million, (J400–J829 million, 5–95%) (Table 1).
In total, a median of 11,122 surveillance visits (1,896–35,839, 5–
95%) were conducted in herds within the protection and
surveillance zones and in traced contact herds.
For each day, the number of herds queuing for surveillance, in
epidemics initiated in cattle herds in high cattle density areas, is
shown in Figure 1. It shows that in a median size epidemic, the
Figure 1. Total number of herds queuing for surveillance visits,
for each day, when epidemics were initiated in cattle herds
located in areas with high cattle density. A basic control strategy
as described by Danish and European legislation was modelled. The
black line represents the 50th percentile, the dark gray lines represent
the 25th and 75th percentiles and the light gray lines represent the 5th
and 95th percentiles. The interrupted line represents the daily
surveillance capacity of 450 herds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.g001
Figure 2. Box plots of the waiting time before a scheduled surveillance visit is executed (days, between a herd was set for
surveillance, and until the herd was actually surveyed), in epidemics that were initiated in cattle herds located in areas with high
cattle density (empty boxes), cattle herds located in areas with low cattle density (light gray boxes), swine herds located in areas
with high swine densities (dark gray boxes), swine herds located in areas with low swine densities (dotted boxes), and in sheep
herds (vertical-dashed boxes). A basic control strategy (Basic) as described by Danish and European legislation is compared to alternative
scenarios, with enlargement of the protection zone from 3 km to 5 km (PZ5) and of the surveillance zone from 10 km to 15 km (SZ15) or 20 km
(SZ20), and a combination of these enlargements. The middle line represents the median, the box represents the 25th and 75th percentiles and the
whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentiles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.g002
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maximum number of herds queuing for surveillance is approxi-
mately 470 herds per day. This means that the available resources
(450 herds per day) are sufficient, so that most often herds will be
surveyed at the same day they were scheduled for surveillance. In
epidemics corresponding to the 75th percentile, the maximum
number of herds queuing for surveillance is approximately 990
herds, while in the 95th percentile situation, the maximum number
is, approximately, 3,100 herds. In such extreme epidemics, the
resources would still be sufficient for surveying herds on time
(within 7 days from assignment to surveillance visit) (Figures 1 and
2). Figure 2, shows box plots of the delay time (days between when
the herd was set for surveillance and when the herd was actually
surveyed) before a scheduled surveillance visit is executed for the
basic and alternative scenarios and the 5 different types of the
index herds. For the basic scenario, generally, herds would be
surveyed at the same day they were set for surveillance.
Nevertheless, long delays can occur when epidemics are large,
but herds would still be visited on time (Figure 2).
Alternative scenarios
When the protection zone was enlarged from 3 to 5 km, in 10 of
the 5,000 iterations that represented the 5 different types of index
herd, the duration of the zones was increased to more than 30
days. When the surveillance zone was enlarged from 10 km to
15 km or 20 km, the number of iterations in which the zone
duration was longer than 30 days were 97 and 315, respectively.
When the protection zone was enlarged to 5 km and the
surveillance zone was simultaneously enlarged to 15 or 20 km,
the number of iterations, in which the zone duration was longer
than 30 days were 98 and 328, respectively. Prolongation of the
zone duration occurred, mainly, when epidemics where initiated
in cattle herds.
Enlarging the protection zone from 3 km to 5 km did not
change the epidemic duration, number of affected herds and the
total costs, regardless the type of index herd that was used to
initiate the epidemics (Table 1). However, enlarging the protection
zone resulted in the lowest total costs for the 5% worse epidemics
(Table 1). Depending on the type of index herd, enlarging the
surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km may reduce epidemic duration
and the number of infected herds, compared to the corresponding
basic scenario, but it would not reduce the economic damage
(Table 1). Enlarging the surveillance zone from 10 to 20 km
resulted frequently in shorter epidemic duration and fewer infected
herds compared to the corresponding basic scenario, especially
when epidemics were initiated in cattle herds (Table 1). However,
in these situations, larger number of surveillance visits and higher
costs were predicted (Table 1). Enlarging the protection zone to
5 km and the surveillance zone to 20 km resulted in the shortest
epidemic duration and the lowest number of infected herds,
regardless the type of index herd that was used to initiate the
epidemics (Table 1). However, this scenario resulted in the largest
number of surveillance visits and costs of the epidemics. When the
surveillance zone is enlarged, longer delays occurred (Figure 2),
due to the larger number of herds queuing for surveillance. This
shows that the surveillance capacity would not be sufficient to
survey herds on time for large epidemics, and hence extra
resources would be needed.
Export losses are the driving force of the total economic losses in
general (Table 1), but it also can be seen that the direct costs may
increase, when the zones are enlarged, compared to the
corresponding basic scenario (Table 1).
Sensitivity analysis
Reducing surveillance capacity would result in longer delay time
before a herd is surveyed, while increasing it would result in a
shorter delay time (Figure 3). Reducing the capacity to 200 herds
per day would result in fewer surveillance visits than the basic
scenario (Table 2). However, it might result in longer epidemic
Figure 3. Box plots of the waiting time before a scheduled surveillance visit is executed (difference, in days, between the day the
herd was set for surveillance, and the day the herd was actually surveyed), in epidemics that were initiated in cattle herds in high
cattle density areas (highCat), cattle herds in low cattle density areas (lowCat), swine herds in high swine density areas (highPig),
swine herds in low swine density areas (lowPig), and in sheep herds (sheep). The basic control strategy as described by Danish and
European legislation (dark gray boxes) with a surveillance capacity of 450 herds per day is compared to scenarios with reduced or increased
surveillance capacity to 200 (empty boxes), 350 (light gray boxes) or 600 (boxes do not appear) herds per day. The middle line represents the median,
the box represents the 25th and 75th percentiles and the whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentiles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.g003
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duration, larger number of infected herds, and larger economic
damage, compared to the corresponding basic scenario (Table 2).
Furthermore, it would result in a notably larger variation in the
number of infected herds and in the total costs, compared to the
corresponding basic scenario (Table 2). Reducing the capacity to
350 herds or increasing it to 600 herds per day did not result in
extra economic losses compared to the corresponding basic
scenario (Table 2).
When the frequency of surveying herds that are located in
overlapping surveillance zones was changed from once every 14
days to once every 7, 21 or 30 days, the number and proportion of
herds located in overlapping surveillance zones were close to those
observed in the corresponding basic scenario. Changing the
frequency to 7 or 30 days, increased or decreased the number of
surveillance visits, respectively, while there were no changes to the
number of infected herds, the number of diagnosed herds from
surveillance and epidemic duration and costs (Table 3).
Increasing surveillance capacity from 450 to 600 herds per day
and enlarging the protection and/or the surveillance zones would
most often not affect epidemic duration, number of infected herds
and total costs (Table 4), compared to the corresponding scenario
using the default surveillance capacity (Table 1). However, more
herds would be surveyed when surveillance capacity is increased
(Table 4).
Discussion
Prior to the UK 2001 epidemic, the contingency plan of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries for notifiable
diseases included that in case of a severe case scenario of spread of
a specific exotic disease, the UK would need 235 veterinary
officers. In a more extensive outbreak, the number of staff needed
might rise to 300 [22]. Nonetheless, during the outbreak, 2,500
temporary veterinary inspectors were assigned, with nearly 70
from abroad, and a further 700 foreign government veterinarians
and personnel assisted on temporary basis [22]. This reflects the
importance of assessing whether available resources are sufficient
to control an epidemic of FMD, in order to improve the
contingency plan. The current study shows that the available
resources for clinical surveillance, in case of an FMD outbreak in
Table 2. Median with (5th and 95th percentiles) of epidemic duration, number of infected herds, number of surveillance visits and
the total costs of the epidemic, using the basic scenario (Basic) that represent the EU and Danish control measures, when
epidemics were initiated in cattle herds in high (highCat) and low (lowCat) cattle density area, swine herds in high (highPig) and
low swine (lowPig) density area and in sheep herds (sheep); The influence of changes in the surveillance capacity (Capacity)
from 450 herds per day to 200, 350 or 600 herds per day are compared.
Epidemic duration (days)1 Infected herds Surveillance visits Total costs (J6106)
highCat
Basic 45 (14–113) 56 (10–192) 11,122 (1,896–35,839) 522 (400–829)
Capacity-200 herds/day 47 (14–114) 57 (10–201) 8,822***2 (1,785–22,250) 523*** (393–1,030)
Capacity-350 herds/day 45 (14–119) 58 (9–197) 11,449 (1,764–32,125) 527 (395–856)
Capacity-600 herds/day 46 (14–113) 57 (10–183) 11,171 (1,900–36,460) 528 (400–809)
lowCat
Basic 57 (17–129) 77 (13–269) 12,746 (1,582–37,561) 558 (405–858)
Capacity-200 herds/day 60 (17–144) 79* (13–297) 10,341*** (1,539–25,940) 564*** (404–1,080)
Capacity-350 herds/day 56 (17–133) 76 (14–249) 12,361*** (1,666–32,663) 556 (405–873)
Capacity-600 herds/day 57 (17–129) 76 (13–244) 12,514 (1,582–39,502) 559 (402–832)
highPig
Basic 33 (7–101) 27 (4–129) 4,852 (656–26,873) 468 (372–726)
Capacity-200 herds/day 36* (7–105) 28* (4–146) 4,822*** (678–19,267) 473** (372–819)
Capacity-350 herds/day 34 (7–106) 27 (4–141) 5,105 (646–25,614) 469 (372–757)
Capacity-600 herds/day 34 (7–103) 28 (4–133) 4,974 (656–27,233) 473 (372–746)
lowPig
Basic 38 (7–113) 32 (4–158) 5,670 (588–25,611) 477 (372–743)
Capacity-200 herds/day 38 (8–115) 32 (4–156) 5,425*** (581–19,628) 479 (369–805)
Capacity-350 herds/day 37 (7–108) 31 (4–148) 5,488** (580–24,048) 477 (369–734)
Capacity-600 herds/day 37 (7–106) 30 (4–146) 5,702** (588–25,128) 474 (373–730)
Sheep
Basic 30 (2–100) 20 (2–138) 3,341 (365–25,220) 449 (354–722)
Capacity-200 herds/day 29 (2–97) 20 (2–142) 3,045*** (343–16,811) 446 (354–775)
Capacity-350 herds/day 30 (2–104) 20 (2–132) 3,203 (365–24,355) 451 (352–720)
Capacity-600 herds/day 29 (2–101) 21 (2–136) 3,331 (365–26,558) 448 (354–714)
1Epidemic duration is calculated from detection of the first herd in the epidemic to the last herd is depopulated.
2Statistical significance level in comparison to the corresponding variable in the corresponding basic scenario (absence of a star represents a P-value$0.05, * represents
a P-value ,0.05, ** represents a P-value ,0.01, and *** represents a P-value ,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.t002
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Denmark, seem to be sufficient to survey herds within the
protection and surveillance zones on time.
Regardless the type of index herd that was used to initiate the
epidemics, reducing surveillance capacity did not change the
epidemic duration and the number of infected herds. Nonetheless,
it resulted in a larger costs and variability around the predicted
costs in most situations, compared to the corresponding basic
scenario. It also resulted in a fewer number of surveillance visits
(Table 2). When surveillance capacity was reduced to 200 herds
per day, a herd would have to wait few days before it could be
surveyed (Figure 3). This delay would apparently not result in
further spread of the disease, as the number of infected herds was
not different from the corresponding basic scenario. Nonetheless,
lower capacity might result in more variability in disease spread,
and thus large epidemics might occur more frequently, as shown
from the 95% percentiles (Table 2). At least, 8 days should elapse
between two surveillance visits (see materials and methods). When
resources were reduced to 200 herds per day, long delay time
occurred (Figure 3), and therefore a herd could be set in the queue
for a new surveillance visit, while the previous visit was not yet
executed. In such cases, the model was set to execute only the first
visit, which resulted in fewer number of surveillance visits (Table 2).
On the other hand, increasing surveillance capacity does not
seem to affect the epidemic course (Table 2). This indicates that
the estimated surveillance capacity in Denmark, under the
modelled regulations, is sufficient to fulfill the EU and Danish
regulations of surveying herds that are within the protection and
surveillance zones without delays. However, when the surveillance
zone was enlarged, the surveillance capacity was normally not
sufficient to survey herds on time, when large epidemics occurred
(Figure 2). Thus extra resources might be needed when the
Veterinary Authorities consider enlarging the surveillance zone.
When the surveillance capacity was increased in scenarios with
enlarged zones, more herds were surveyed, as a result of shorter
waiting times for surveillance visits. Repeated visits that were not
executed due to the lack of resources in the basic scenario were
now executed, due to the availability of more resources.
Nevertheless, enlargement of the zones combined with extra
surveillance capacity, in most situations, did not minimize the
economic losses of the simulated epidemics (Table 4).
Table 3. Median with (5th and 95th percentiles) of epidemic duration, number of infected herds, number of diagnosed herds from
surveillance, number of surveillance visits and the total costs of the epidemic, using the basic scenario (Basic) that represent the
EU and Danish control measures, when epidemics were initiated in cattle herds in high (highCat) and low (lowCat) cattle density
area, swine herds in high (highPig) and low (lowPig) swine density area and in sheep herds (sheep); The influence of changing
the frequency of surveying herds located in overlapping zones from every 14 days to every 7, 21 or 30 days is compared.
Epidemic duration
(days)1
Infected
herds
Diagnosed herds from
surveillance Surveillance visits Total costs (J6106)
highCat
Basic 45 (14–113) 56 (10–192) 7 (0–27) 11,122 (1,896–35,839) 522 (400–829)
Survey every 7 days 46 (14–117) 56 (9–197) 7 (1–23) 15,381***2 (1,967–40,248) 528 (397–822)
Survey every 21 days 47 (14–113) 59 (9–191) 7 (1–24) 10,298 (1,680–32,312) 534 (399–817)
Survey every 30 days 48 (14–110) 59 (9–185) 7 (1–24) 9,989*** (1,575–29,301) 536 (399–800)
lowCat
Basic 57 (17–129) 77 (13–269) 10 (1–36) 12,746 (1,582–37,561) 558 (405–858)
Survey every 7 days 55 (17–126) 75 (13–259) 11 (1–37) 16,585*** (2,007–44,861) 548 (406–852)
Survey every 21 days 57 (17–129) 76 (14–259) 10 (1–38) 11,110** (1,489–33,343) 557 (403–836)
Survey every 30 days 61 (17–140) 79 (14–271) 10 (1–39) 10,634*** (1,420–32,248) 569 (403–882)
highPig
Basic 33 (7–101) 27 (4–129) 3 (0–17) 4,852 (656–26,873) 468 (372–726)
Survey every 7 days 34 (7– 102) 28 (4–121) 3 (0–17) 6,571*** (755–31,191) 467 (372–719)
Survey every 21 days 34 (7–98) 28 (4–127) 3 (0–15) 4,549 (642–21,623) 469 (372–712)
Survey every 30 days 34 (7–97) 27 (4–127) 3 (0–15) 4,066** (642–20,197) 468 (372–710)
lowPig
Basic 38 (7–113) 32 (4–158) 4 (0–22) 5,670 (588–25,611) 477 (372–743)
Survey every 7 days 37 (7–112) 30 (4–146) 4 (0–22) 7,454*** (658–33,284) 476 (370–753)
Survey every 21 days 41 (7–112) 33 (4–151) 4 (0–22) 5,276 (581–22,637) 487 (372–756)
Survey every 30 days 39 (7–113) 32 (4–142) 4 (0–18) 4,575** (581–21,385) 482 (372–748)
Sheep
Basic 30 (2–100) 20 (2–138) 2 (0–19) 3,341 (365–25,220) 449 (354–722)
Survey every 7 days 28 (2–100) 19 (2–134) 2 (0–19) 3,969** (382–31,743) 445 (352–725)
Survey every 21 days 30 (2–108) 20 (2–140) 2 (0–17) 3,032*** (365–24,442) 449 (354–753)
Survey every 30 days 31 (2–105) 21 (2–140) 2 (0–18) 2,781* (365–21,207) 450 (354–734)
1Epidemic duration is calculated from detection of the first herd in the epidemic to the last herd is depopulated.
2Statistical significance level in comparison to the corresponding variable in the corresponding basic scenario (absence of a star represents a P-value$0.05, * represents
a P-value ,0.05, ** represents a P-value ,0.01, and *** represents a P-value ,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.t003
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Overlapping zones are expected to occur during an outbreak. It
is important to determine, how often herds should be re-surveyed,
in order to optimize FMD control, when new zones are created,
including herds already in other zones. As explained earlier, we
assumed that herds within overlapping surveillance zones would
be surveyed every 14 days, as long as they are in overlapping
zones. This assumption was based on expert knowledge from the
Veterinary Authorities and their experience with other disease
outbreaks. Nonetheless, a sensitivity analysis was conducted by
changing this value to 7, 21 and 30 days. Increasing the
surveillance frequency to every 7 days would not change the
course of the epidemic, nor the number of detected herds through
surveillance (Table 3). Furthermore, reducing it to every 21 or 30
days would not change the number of herds detected through
surveillance nor the total costs (Table 3). Generally, this indicates
that the first surveillance visit seems to be important to detect
herds early through surveillance. Repeated visits for these herds do
not seem to be necessary, and thus can be minimized. It is
important to mention though, that the model assumes that the
surveillance teams are highly effective in finding clinical signs if
present. During an outbreak, veterinarians will be very aware of
the possibility of infection, and thus they will most likely find
existing clinical signs. Given the availability of resources, the
Veterinary Authorities would most likely re-survey herds as
frequently as possible, in order to convince the World Organiza-
tion of Animal Health (OIE) and EU member states of the
sufficiency of the applied measures, to regain the free status as fast
as possible.
Table 4. Median with (5th and 95th percentiles) of epidemic duration, number of infected herds, number of surveillance visits and
the total costs of the epidemic, following enlargements of the protection zone from 3 km to 5 km (PZ5) and surveillance zone
from 10 km to 15 km (SZ15) or 20 km (SZ20), and a combination of these enlargements, and increasing surveillance capacity
from 450 herds per day to 600 herds per day, when epidemics were initiated in cattle herds in high (highCat) and low (lowCat)
cattle density area, swine herds in high (highPig) and low (lowPig) swine density area and in sheep herds (sheep).
Epidemic duration (days)1 Infected herds Surveillance visits Total costs (J6106)
highCat
PZ5 44 (13–106) 55 (9–178) 12,287 (1,868–40,073) 525 (399–799)
SZ15 42 (13–99) 52 (8–167) 16,703*2 (2,842–46,513) 538 (399–852)
SZ20 40 (13–96) 48 (9–169) 19,941*** (3,569–51,503) 544 (407–944)
PZ5+SZ15 43 (13–97) 52 (10–162) 18,201** (3,164–45,972) 540 (404–823)
PZ5+SZ20 41 (13–89) 48 (9–144) 21,010*** (4,105–47,190) 557 (408–855)
lowCat
PZ5 56 (18–136) 76 (13–264) 13,772 (1,904–45,936) 552 (405–868)
SZ15 51 (16–114) 68 (12–225) 17,192 (2,129–48,082) 557 (404–854)
SZ20 47* (15–106) 63 (12–215) 20,991* (2,747–53,332) 559* (413–947)
PZ5+SZ15 53 (17–117) 65 (12–242) 18,789* (2,786–50,217) 565 (412–860)
PZ5+SZ20 49 (16–115) 64 (12–212) 22,273*** (3,334–56,115) 568 (412–944)
highPig
PZ5 35 (7–107) 28 (4–129) 5,715 (837–29,283) 473 (372–751)
SZ15 33 (7–92) 27 (4–108) 8,363 (1,276–34,616) 482 (376–734)
SZ20 32 (7–82) 25 (4–93) 10,647 (1,610–38,393) 485 (379–762)
PZ5+SZ15 33 (7–86) 26 (4–104) 8,467 (1,343–34,282) 480 (376–723)
PZ5+SZ20 32 (7–83) 25 (4–98) 11,121 (1,846–39,143) 491 (381–751)
lowPig
PZ5 37 (7–110) 30 (4–158) 5,837 (737–30,835) 473 (273–559)
SZ15 33 (7–91) 28 (4–117) 8,351 (1,090–31,455) 474 (275–520)
SZ20 34 (7–89) 28 (4–111) 11,644* (1,610–39,374) 488 (278–561)
PZ5+SZ15 35 (8–102) 29 (4–129) 8,928 (1,230–36,426) 481 (275–566)
PZ5+SZ20 34 (8–90) 28 (4–118) 12,185** (1,772–38,772) 489 (282–552)
Sheep
PZ5 30 (2–102) 20 (2–124) 3,740 (410–27,242) 449 (352–725)
SZ15 29 (2–88) 19 (2–116) 5,409 (638–35,592) 456 (360–715)
SZ20 28 (3–86) 18 (2–104) 7,896 (795–40,161) 462 (361–763)
PZ5+SZ15 29 (2–88) 18 (2–123) 5,651 (702–36,926) 454 (358–727)
PZ5+SZ20 28 (3–90) 18 (2–116) 7,954 (837–43,499) 461 (363–792)
1Epidemic duration is calculated from detection of the first herd in the epidemic to the last herd is depopulated.
2Statistical significance level in comparison to the corresponding variable and scenario in Table 1 (absence of a star represents a P-value $0.05, * represents a P-value ,
0.05, ** represents a P-value ,0.01, and *** represents a P-value ,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102480.t004
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Enlarging the protection zone was as good as the corresponding
basic scenario, in terms of epidemic duration, number of affected
herds and total epidemic costs. Although it resulted in larger
number of surveillance visits compared to the corresponding basic
scenario, the resources were usually sufficient to survey herds on
time. Furthermore, enlarging the protection zone was a cheaper
strategy than the corresponding basic scenario, in case of large
epidemics as indicated by the 95th percentile of the total costs of
this scenario, regardless the index herd type that was used to
initiate the epidemics (Table 1). Enlarging the protection zone was
as good as the basic scenario in median size epidemics, but it
included the advantage of minimizing economic losses in case of
large epidemics, which makes it a better strategy than the basic
scenario.
In certain situations, enlarging the surveillance zones resulted in
shorter epidemic duration and lower number of infected herds
(Table 1). However, it resulted frequently in larger number of
surveillance visits (Table 1), and hence to extra delays, before
herds can be visited (Figure 2). It also resulted in larger total costs
compared to the corresponding basic scenario. This was due to the
larger number of surveillance visits, which lead to higher direct
costs (Table 1). Important to mention that it was assumed in the
economic calculations that only herds outside the surveillance
zones can export products to EU countries, without price
reduction [10]. This means that enlargement of the surveillance
zones would result in larger economic damage due to larger export
loss to the EU countries (Table 1). Moreover, it was more often
necessary to prolong the duration of the zones, when the
surveillance zones were enlarged compared to the basic scenario.
Longer zone duration means larger economic damage due to
larger export loss. Generally, this means that the potential gain
from shorter epidemic duration and fewer infected herds, caused
by the enlarged surveillance zone, would not pay off the economic
damage due to the higher costs. Shorter epidemic duration and
fewer infected herds might actually include an advantage of
reducing the risk of losing markets. In case of an epidemic,
countries that import livestock and/or livestock products from
Denmark might either find other suppliers and completely stop
imports from Denmark, or might continue imports, following the
end of the restriction on export, but with a lesser extent than
before the epidemic. Although it is difficult to predict the reaction
of foreign markets in case of an epidemic [10,23], the risk of losing
markets would probably positively correlate with epidemic
duration. Thus the economic outcomes might differ depending
on the reaction of the importing countries.
The results shown in our study are influenced by the herd
structure in Denmark and the large export of especially pigs and
pig products. Therefore, the effect of enlarged zone sizes might be
different in other countries. Furthermore, in this study we focused
on zone size and surveillance capacity with the basic control
strategy. In future work, it will be interesting to investigate the
effect of changes on, for example, pre-emptive depopulation or
emergency vaccination.
Conclusions
The available resources for clinical surveillance, in case of an
FMD outbreak in Denmark, are sufficient to survey herds in the
protection and surveillance zones within the first week of the
zones’ establishment, under EU and Danish control regulations.
However, when enlarging the surveillance zone is considered,
extra resources may be needed, in order to survey herds on time.
Generally, enlargement of the protection zone seems to be a better
option than the basic scenario. Enlarging the surveillance zone
may reduce epidemic duration and the number of affected herds.
However, reduction of the economic losses would not be expected.
Extra resources for clinical surveillance do not minimize the total
costs of the epidemic when the protection and/or surveillance
zones are enlarged. Fewer resources may result in larger and
costlier epidemics.
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